Western New England Law Review
Volume 5 5 (1982-1983)
Issue 3

Article 10

1-1-1983

DISABILITY LAW—THE
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED
ASSISTANCE AND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT IS
ALIVE AND WELL IN NEW
HAMPSHIRE—Developmental Disabilities
Advocacy Center, Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st
Cir. 1982)
Nancy B. Alisberg

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Nancy B. Alisberg, DISABILITY LAW—THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED ASSISTANCE AND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT IS
ALIVE AND WELL IN NEW HAMPSHIRE—Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc. v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1982), 5
W. New Eng. L. Rev. 537 (1983), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol5/iss3/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

NOTES
DISABILITY LAW-THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED ASSISTANCE
AND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT IS ALIVE AND WELL AND LIVING IN NEW
HAMPSHIRE-Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Cent~r, Inc. v.
Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (Ist Cir. 1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The history of the events that led to the filing of Developmental
Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc. v. Melton 1 (DDAC) began on July
1, 198J2 began on April 12, 1978 when Garrity v. Gallen 3 was filed in
the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire,
by six mentally retarded residents of Laconia State School (LSS).4
Plaintiffs in Garrity alleged violations of the United States Constitu
tion and both federal and state law on behalf of themselves and
other similarly situated mentally retarded citizens of the State of
New Hampshire. s The suit attacked the conditions and practices at
LSS and sought injunctive relief under The Develop~ental1y Dis
abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act6 (DD Act), the nondiscrimi
nation section of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,1 and the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act. 8 Plaintiffs sought a ruling which
would require that their right to habilitation9 be respected and that
they be placed in the least restrictive placement; 10 a community
I. 521 F. Supp. 365 (D.N.H. 1981), vaca/~d in pari and remanded, 689 F.2d 281 (1st
Cir. 1982).
2.. Brief of Harold Tuttle, Alice Graham and Lillian Cook, Residents of Laconia
State School at 7, DDAC v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir: 1982).
3. 522 F. Supp. 171 (D.N .H. 1981).
4. Jd at 176.
5. Jd at 175-76.
6. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6000-6081 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81).
7. 29 U.S.c. § 794 (Supp. V 1981).
8. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-1461 (1976 & Supp. V·1981).
9. "Habilitation" is a term of art that refers to the education, training and care
persons with retardation require to achieve their maximum development. 522 F. Supp.
at 176 n.IO.
10. A least restrictive placement is considered to be one of the basic rights of per
sons with mental retardation. This right can be viewed as the right of the person to live
in an environment as close as possible to that of the mainstream of society. Such an
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placement .. I Joining the action was the New Hampshire Associa
tion for Retarded Citizens, and, as plaintiff intervenor, the United
States of America. 12
The trial was long and involved.13 LSS was subject to a con
stant flow of visitors pursuant to the trial. These visitors included
attorneys, experts, and others involved in the litigation. 14 In re
sponse to this steady stream of visitors, the administration of LSS
implemented a procedure by which visitors were required to report
to the administration building, and if they were not "parents, rela
tives, legal guardians, court-appointed representatives, or other offi
cial representatives, or lacked documented proof to visit," the visit
would be denied. IS At the request of The Developmental Disabili
ties Advocacy Center (DDAC), the independent agency charged by
federal statute to protect the rights of the developmentally disabled 16
of New Hampshire and to provide advocacy services to this popula
tion,17 formal visitation regulations were promulgated by the office
of the Attorney General. 18 DDAC, however, contended that the reg
ulations as promulgated were unsatisfactory as "they contravene
both statutorily and constitutionally established rights of the parties
environment could be for the person to live with his or her own family. Herr, The New
Clients: Legal Servicesfor Mentally Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 553, 560 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Herr, TIre New Clients).
11. The term "community placement" was used in reference to residential parents'
homes, foster homes and group homes. 522 F. Supp. at 176 n.lI.
12. Id
13. The Garril)' litigation took place in a forty-one day trial during the spring and
summer of 1980. Id at 175; DDAC v. Melton, 521 F. Supp. at 367 n.1.
14. DDAC v. Melton, 521 F. Supp. at 367.
15. Id
16. As presently defined,
(7) The term 'developmental disability' means a severe, chronic disability
of a person which
(A) is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of
mental and physical impairments;
(8) is manifested before the person attains age twenty-two;
(C) is likely to continue indefinitely;
(D) results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the
following areas of major life activity: (i) self-care, (ii) receptive and expressive
language, (iii) learning, (iv) mobility, (v) self-direction, (vi) capacity for in
dependent living, and (vii) economic self-sufficiency; and
(E) reflects the person's need for a combination and sequence of special,
interdisciplinary, or generic care, treatment, or other services which are of life
long or extended duration, and are individually planned and coordinated.
42 U.S.C. § 6001(7) (Supp. IV 1980). In this note, the concepts, as discussed, apply to the
developmentally disabled and to persons with mental illness.
17. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
18. 521 F. Supp. at 367. The regulations provide as follows:
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PART He-M 802 VISITS TO CLIENTS AT LACONIA STATE SCHOOL.
He-M 802.01 Purpose. The purpose of these rules is to outline the policy
and procedures for visits to clients who live at Laconia state school.
He-M 802.02 Definition. The words and phrases used in this section shall
mean the following, except where a different meaning is specified or clearly
intended from the context. The use of the masculine form includes the femi
nine throughout.
(a) "Administrator" means the superintendent at Laconia state school.
(b) "Appropriately constituted interdisciplinary body" means a team in
cluding at least a program coordinator or case manager and a psychologist.
This team may also include other retardation professionals and other persons
concerned with the welfare of the client.
(c) "Client" means a recipient of services at Laconia state school.
(d) "Division" means the division of mental health and developmental
services.
(e) " "Family member" means the child, brother, sister. spouse. grandpar
ent, grandchild, step-parent, aunt, uncle or cousin of the client.
(f) "Guardian" means a guardian of the person or a temporary guardian
of the person appointed under RSA 464-A.
(g) "Laconia state school" means the Laconia state school and training
center in Laconia, New Hampshire.
(h) "Parent" means a natural or adoptive parent whose parental rights
have not been terminated or limited by judicial decree.
(i) "Program coordinator" means a qualified mental retardation" profes
sional who has been designated as administratively responsible for the opera
tion of a given residential unit at Laconia state school.
(j) "Representative" means an individual who is in a position to safe
guard the client's interests and who has been designated the client's representa
tive under RSA 171-A:2.
He-M 802.03 Policy.
(a) Clients have a right to receive visitors: Clients also have a right to IX:
free from unwanted visitors or intrusion.
(b) Visits to the client by parents, family members, guardians, court ap
pointed attorneys, representatives and personal physicians are strongly en
couraged.
(c) All visitors should make every effort to interfere as little as possible
with programs and services to clients. Therefore, although visits will be al
lowed at any reasonable time, visitors are encouraged to visit between 9:00 a.m.
and 9:00 p.m.
(d) Although visits generally have a therapeutic effect for clients. some
visits may adversely affect or harm a client. Accordingly, the division may limit
visitation in accordance with these rules.
He-M 802.04 Visiting Procedures.
(a) Any person may request authorization to visit a client from the client
or administrator.
(b) All visitors to Laconia state school must report to the front desk in the
administration building prior to visiting any client or staff member.
(c) The administrator or his designee may obtain the following
information:
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the name and address of the visitor;
2. the name of the client;
3. the relationship, if any, between the visitor and the client; and
4. the reason for the requested visit.
(e) The visitor must also report to the program coordinator or his desig
nee at the residential building.
He-M 802.05 Visits authorized by a client.
(a) Except as provided in (c) below, a client who is 18 years of age or
older and who does not have a guardian may authorize any person to visit him.
(b) Except as provided in (c) below, any client 18 years of age or older
who does not have a guardian may refuse to receive any visitor.
(c) If an appropriately constituted interdisciplinary body has recom
mended that guardianship proceedings be instituted for a client, the visitor must
apply to the administrator as provided in He-M 802.07.
(d) The administrator or his designee shall not prevent visits authorized
in (a) above unless he believes that the visit will adversely affect the client.
He-M 802.06 Visits authorized by guardians and certai" parents.
(a) The guardian of a client may visit the client and authorize any person
to visit the client.
(b) A parent of a client under the age of 18 may visit the client and may
authorize any person to visit the client.
(c) A guardian of a client and the parent of a client under the age of 18
may limit visitors to such clients by notifying the administrator of such limita
tions in writing.
(d) If the parent or guardian in (c) above has not expressly limited visita
tion, the administrator may allow visits using the procedures in He-M 802.07.
(e) The administrator shall not prevent visits authorized under (a) or (b)
above unless he believes that the visit may adversely affect the client.
He-M 802.08 Visits and visitors authorized as the result 0/ a court order. If
a particular visit or visitor is expressly authorized by the order of a court of
competent jurisdiction, the visit shall be allowed in accordance with the re
quirements of the order. If the order sets no specific requirements on the visit
or visitors, the administrator shall allow the visit in accordance with procedures
set forth at He-M 802.04.
He-M 802.09 Determination by program coordinator.
(a) A program coordinator who determines that visits or certain visitors
would adversely affect a client shall so notify the administrator in writing.
(b) The administrator shall investigate the determination. If he concurs,
he shall determine what limits on visiting are necessary. He shall then notify
the following people of his decision:
1. the client,
2. the guardian of the client, if any,
3. the parent of a client under the age of 18, if any,
4. the court appointed attorney for the client, if any, and
5. the representative of the client, if any.
6. the program coordinator.
He-M 802.10 Appeal Procedure. Individuals aggrieved by the operation of
these rules may appeal using the complaint procedure at Laconia state school.
He-M 802.11 Access to records. Rules governing access to records at Laco
nia state school are contained at He-M 803.
1.
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PART He-M 803 ACCESS TO RECORDS AT LACONIA STATE SCHOOL
He-M 803.01 Purpose. The purpose of these rules is to outline the policy
and procedures for access to client records at Laconia state school.
He-M 803.02 Definitions. The words and phrases used in this section shall
mean the following, except where a different meaning is specified or clearly
intended from the context. The masculine form includes the feminine.
(a) "Appropriately Constituted Interdisciplinary Body" means a team in
cluding at least a program coordinator or case manager and a psychologist.
This team may include other retardation professionals and other persons con
cerned with the welfare of the client.
(b) "Case Manager" means 'a staff person under contract with the divi
sion who is responsibie for individual serviCe planning and placement proce
dures in the community.
(c) "Client" means a person who resides at and receives services from
Laconia state school.
(d) "Guardian"means a guardian of the person or a temporary guardian
of the person, appoiDted under RSA 464-A.
(e) "Human Rights Committee" means a committee established under
RSA 171-A:17.
(f) "Individual Service Plan" means the plan for a client's habilitation
and treatment defined in RSA 171-A:2, X
(g) "Laconia State 'School" means the Laconia state school and training
.
center in Laconia, New Hampshire.
(h)' "Parent" means a natural or adoptive parent whose parental rights
have not been terminated or limited by judicial decree.
(i) "Records" means all records .of a client relating to treatment, training
and habilitation.
OJ "Representative" means an individual who is in a position to safe
guard the client's interests and who has been designated the client's representa
tive under RSA l71-A:2, XV-b.
(k) "Service Delivery System" means the comprehensive array of serv
ices, including programs, residences and treatment defined in RSA 171-A:2,
XVI.
'
(I) "Service Plan Team" means a group of individuals, including a case
manager, representing both a community program and Laconia state school,
who are responsible for holding client-centered conferences to construct the in
dividual's service plan. For the purposes of these rules, community program
shall include other state agencies involved in the construction of the client's
service plan.
(m) "Superintendent" means the superintendent of Laconia state school
or his designee.
He-M 803.03 Policy.
(a) All records regarding a particular client are the property of Laconia
state school.
(b) These records are confidential and access to them may not be author
ized except in accordance with the procedures set forth in these rules.
(c) These rules do not apply to information which does not identify the
client.
He-M 803.04 Access to Records hy clients. All clients shall have access to
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their own records except clients under the age of 18 and clients who have a
guardian.
He-M 803.05 Access to Records by Guardians and Certain Parents.
(a) A guardian of a client shall have access to the records of the client.
(b) Parents of a client under the age of 18 shall have access to the records
of the client.
He-M 803.06 Access to Records by a Representative. An individual who
has been designated under RSA l71-A:2, as the representative ofa client shall
have access to the records of the client.
He-M 803.07 Access to Records Under a Wrillen Authorization.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), a person who has access to
records under section 803.04, section 803.05 or section 803.06 may grant access
to all or pan of such records to another person by signing a release of informa
tion form.
(b) The release of information form shall state:
I. The name of the client;
2. The name of the person authorizing release;
3. The name of the person or agency to whom the information
is to be released;
4. The specific information to be released;
5. The purpose for which the information is to be released;
6. The length of time for which the authorization is valid; and
7. A statement by the receiver acknowledging the responsibility
to- maintain the confidentiality of the information released.
The receiver shall also acknowledge the responsibility to use
the information only for the purpose for which it was
released.
(c) Where an appropriately constituted interdisciplinary body has recom
mended that guardianship proceedings be instituted for a client, the superinten
dent shall review any written authorization. If the superintendent believes that
release of the information will have an adverse effect on the client, the superin
tendent may deny access. The client may appeal the denial to the human rights
committee.
He-M 803.08 Access to Records by Authorized Review Organization and
Third Parry Payors. The superintendent shall authorize access to client records
by individuals or organizations who are mandated by law, regulation or rule to
inspect records. If access is authorized, the superintendent shall notify the indi
vidual with authority to grant access under 803.07 that access has been granted.
He-M 803.09 Access to Records by Professionals on the Service Plan Team.
The superintendent may authorize access to records by professionals on the
service plan team who need the information in order to complete the individual
service plan. When access has been granted, the superintendent shall notify the
person authorized to grant access under He-M 803.07.
He-M 803.10 Access to Records by Certain Allorneys. An attorney who has
been appointed by a coun to represent the legal interests of a client shall have
access to the records of the client.
He-M 803.11 Procedures for Examining Records.
(a) Persons who have access or who have been granted access to records
may examine the records only between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
Monday through Friday. Records shall not be examined on holidays.
(b) Each person wishing to examine records shall provide evidence of his
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whom DDAC seeks to represent."19 Thus, in July, 1981, DDAC
filed suit in the same court that heard Garrity, challenging the regu
lations and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief affirming their
right to have access to residents at LSS.20 Joining the suit were four
residents of LSS suing through their next friend. 21 The individual
plaintiffs sued' on their own behalf and on behalf of all other persons
similarly situated. 22
On September 2, 1981, after a day-long hearing, Chief Judge
Devine, the same judge who heard Garrity, dismissed DDAC.23
Judge Devine found that neither DDAC nor the individually named
plaintiffs had sufficient standing to bring the action. 24 As to plain
tiffs' statutory claims, the court found that neither the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 nor the DO Act granted a cause of action to DDAC or to
the individual plaintiffs. 2s Nor would the court recognize a cause of
action based upon New Hampshire statutory law. 26 Regarding the
first and fourteenth amendment claims27 raised by the plaintiffs, the
court held that "[r]eview of the spate of overblown rhetoric advanced
authority to examine the records. In addition the person must sign a log book
stating his name, the name of the client, and his relationship to the dient.
(c) Access shall be denied to any person who does not comply with the
provisions of (b) above.
(d) Records shall be examined only at a location designated by the super
intendent and shall not be removed from such location without prior approval
of the superintendent.
(e) Each person who has access to records under sections 803.07, 803.08.
803.09, or 803.10 shall agree in writing to preserve the confidentiality of such
records and to assume all liability for disclosure of such records.
(f)' Ponions of the records may be copied only at Laconia state school,
provided the person requesting the copying pays the fee for such copying in
advance.
New Hampshire Div. of Mental Health and Developmental Servs. Regulations (Draft.
Dec. 16, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Draft Regulations), quoted in Brief of Appellants at
297-306a, DDAC v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief of
Appellants).
19. 521 F. Supp. at 367.
20, Brief of Appellants at I68-70a, supra note 18.
21. 521 F. Supp. at 366.
'
'
22. Brief of Appellants at 148a, supra note 18. The class consists of:
All developmentally disabled persons who reside at, or are on the rolls of.
Laconia State School and who need or will need or who seek or will seek mean
ingful access to, communication, with, or the services of an attorney, the
Developmena1 [sic) Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc., or their agents or
employees.
23. 521 F. Supp. at 372.
24. Id
25. Id at 369.
26. Id
27. See Brief of Appellants at 145a, supra note 18.
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both orally and in writing in the course of this litigation might lead
one to believe that the associational rights under the First and the
right of access to courts under the Fourteenth Amendments are
somehow implicated. They are not."28
On September 22, 1982, in Developmental Disabilities Advocacy
Center v. Melton ,29 the First Circuit vacated the judgment as to
DDAC and remanded the case to the district court.30 While the
original complaint was grounded in both statutory and constitutional
issues,31 on appeal, the DDAC pressed only its first amendment
claim. 32 Expressing no view on the merits, the First Circuit held that
as a nonprofit legal advocacy group, DDAC had standing to assert
its first amendment rights of association to have access to the very
group it was created to serve. 33
The author of this note submits that, on remand, the district
court should grant the relief requested by plaintiffs. The need for
independent, meaningful advocacy services has been given legisla
tive approvaP4 as a result of a clear consensus of commentators that
such a need exists.3S It will be shown that the regulations as promul
gated by the State of New Hampshire make these services meaning
less by restricting certain attorneys' access to both the residents of
LSS and to their records. 36
The basis for such a finding, however, need not rest on first
amendment grounds alone: "The federal courts have long been di
rected to decide whether causes of action can be supported on statu
tory grounds before they adjudicate constitutional law issues."37 It
will be demonstrated that plaintiffs have a cause of action under sec
tion 6012 of the DD Act,38 given the manner in which the act was
28. 521 F. Supp. at 368.
29. 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1982).
30. Id at 288. The First Circuit did, however, affirm the judgment as to the indio
vidually named plaintiffs. It agreed with the lower coun's decision that Freda Smith, the
next friend, did not have standing to sue on behalf of the named plaintiffs. Id at 284.
3J. 521 F. Supp. at 367.
32. 689 F.2d at 282 n.3.
33. Id at 287; see id at 287-88 for a discussion of the history of non-profit legal
advocacy organizations' rights under the first amendment.
34. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6012 (West Supp. 1978-81). See infra notes 45-59 and accompa
nying text.
35. See infra notes 48, 108-28 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 158-67 and accompanying text.
37. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 94 (3d Cir.
1979), rev'd and remanded, 451 U.S. I (1982), on remand, 673 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.). cerro
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528. 543 (1974); Siler
V. Louisville &Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909).
38. See infra note 57; see also infro notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
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construed by the district court in Garrity. 39 A resolution of the issues
in DDAC based on the DD Act would comport with the general
theory that constitutional issues should not be the basis of a decision
if there is an applicable statutory ground. Furthermore, in Pennhursl
Slale School and Hospitarv. Halderman,4O the DD Act lost a great
deal of its potential power to provide individuals with developmen
tal disabilities with an avenue to protect their rights. 41 If the plain
tiffs in DDAC can be successful in assert~g a claim under the DD
Act, within the limitations imposed by the court in Garrity,42 this
important piece of legislation may once again become more than
"politically self-serving but essentially meaningless language about
what the developmentally disabled deserve at the hands of state and
federal authorities."43
II.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Righls Act
Perhaps, as Dostoyevsky said . . . the measure of a society's de
gree of civilization is to be found in the care it affords its most
disabled members. Unfortunately, custodial approaches to the .
needs of the retarded . . . cannot be expected to be eliminated
instantaneously or effortlessly. But the era of human warehouses,
at least for the retarded, is hopefully drawing to a close. Legal
activity is apparently hastening that end. Too many retarded per
sons have needlessly endured lives of suffering, waste and oblivion
for society to tolerate any other outcome.
Our present laws, scientific knowledge, and sense of con
science compel us to reexamine a system which has often chosen
to incarcerate rather than habilitate. Toward that objective the
advocates of the retarded seek to give voice to the pains of the
silent, and to make possible lives of dignity and productiveness for

39. 522 F. Supp. at 195-205; see infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
40. 451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand, 673 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2956 (1982).
41. Id. at 11 (holding that section 6010 does not create substantive rights). See
Ferleger, Rights and Dignity: Congress, The Supreme Court, and People with Disabilities
After Pennhurst, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 327 (1983); Comment, United States-Mental
Health-The "Bill ojRights" ojthe Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights
Act Did Not Create Substantive Rights jor the Mentally Retarded to Appropriate Treatment
in the Least Restrictive Environment. 58 N.D.L. REV. 119, 131 (1982); Note, Pennhurst v.
Halderman: A Bill oj Rights in Name Only, 13 U. TaL. L. REV. 214,232 (1981).
42. 522 F. Supp. at 205; see infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
43. 451 U.S. at 32 (B1ackmun, J., concurring in pan).
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the humble. 44

The measure of this society's degree of civilization in regard to
persons with retardation can be found in the Developmentally Dis
abled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975. 45 The bill, as it was
enacted in 1975, was an outgrowth of the Mental Retardation Facili
ties and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of
1963.46 The Act was expanded in 1970 to cover all developmental
disabilities,47 and, in the wake of further congressional awareness of
the plight of the developmentally disabled, the Bill of Rights section
(section 6010) of the DD Act was passed in 1975.48
The bill, as promulgated by the Senate, contained a comprehen
sive and highly detailed list of rights to be accorded the developmen
tally disabled. 49 Although the House agreed "that for the vast
majority of individuals institutional care is inappropriate and inhu
44. Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional Rights ofthe
.
Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995, 1026 (1972).
45. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6000-6081 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81).
46. Pub. L. No. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282. See H.R. REP. No. 58, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 919, 920 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 58}.
47. Developmental Disabilities Service and Facilities Construction Amendments
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-517,84 Stat. 1316.
48. 121 CONGo REC. 29,309 (1975) (House); id at 29,317 (Senate). Testimony was
heard by Congress which dramatized the plight of the developmentally disabled. Dr.
Roben Cook summarized their plight by stating that, "[t}he institutionalized mentally
retarded are the most neglected of all persons in our society. They have been subjected
to ethical and legal abuses, with loss of rights, both civil and personal, frequently occur
ing without even a semblance of due process." S. REP. No. 160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1975) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. l6O}.
The conclusions reached by the Senate were finn and clear:
The Committee is firmly convinced that Congress must take action to ensure
the humane care, treatment, habilitation, and protection of mentally retarded
and other persons with developmental disabilities. The Federal Government
has the responsibility to provide equal protection under the law to all citizens.
Expens in the field of developmental disabilities as well as in civil rights
law now agree that every effon should be made to insure that our developmen
tally disabled citizens are provided every opponunity of being cared for in the
least restrictive setting that is consistent with the person's ability for self-care.
Therefore, the intent of this legislation is not only to improve care in resi
dential facilities, but also to minimize inappropriate admissions and to stimu
late the States to develop alternative programs of care for mentally retarded
and other developmentally disabled persons.
Id at 32-33.
49. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. 42. reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 961.
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mane,"50 it did not agree that a comprehensive listing of "rights" was
necessary to achieve the goal of deinstitutionalization. 51 The com
promise achieved included a list of "Congressional findings respect
ing rights of developmentally disabled."52
Congress was concerned, not only with establishing rights for
50.

AD.

H.R. REP. No. 58, supra note 37, at 15, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo &

NEWS

933.

51. "Plans for the elimination of inappropriate placement in institutions . . .
should generally include plans for preventing such inappropriate placement in the first
place . . . ." Id., supra note 46, at 17, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
935.
42 U.S.c.A. § 6010 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81).
§ 6010. Congressional findings respecting rights of developmentally
disabled
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of persons with
developmental disabilities:
(I) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate
treatment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with develop
mental disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential
of the person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the
persons' personal liberty.
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to
assure that public funds are not provided to any institutional or other residen
tial program for persons with developmental disabilities that
(A) does not prqvide treatment, services, and habilitation which is
appropriate to the needs of such persons; or
(8) does not meet the following minimum standards:
(i) Provision of a nourishing, well-balanced daily diet to the
persons with developmental disabilities being served by the program.
(ii) Provision to such persons of appropriate and sufficient med
ical and dental services.
(iii) Prohibition of the use of physical restraint on such persons
unless absolutely necessary and prohibition of the use of such restraint
as a punishment or as a substitute for a habilitation program.
(iv) Prohibition on the excessive use of chemical restraints on
such persons and the use of such restraints as punishment or as a sub
stitute for a habilitation program or in quantities that interfere with
services, treatment, or habilitation for such persons.
(v) Pennission for close relatives of such persons to visit them at
reasonable hours without prior notice.
(vi) Compliance with adequate fire and safety standards as may
be promulgated by the Secretary.
(4) All programs for persons with developmental disabilities should meet
standards which are designed to assure the most favorable possible outcome for
those served, and
(A) in the case of residential programs serving persons in need of
comprehensive health-related, habilitative, or rehabilitative services, which
are at least equivalent to those standards applicable to intennediate care
facilities for the mentally retarded promulgated in regulations of the Secre
tary on January 17, 1974 (39 Fed.Reg. pI. 1I), as appropriate when taking
52.
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persons with developmental disabilities, but also in seeing that those
rights would be enforced. s3 The House Committee was "well aware
that ... disabled and handicapped citizens are often unreasonably
and unnecessarily deprived of their rights and relegated to second
class status."54 Given the understanding of this situation in 1970,
one of the three major areas of emphasis for projects funded by the
Developmental Disabilities Act of 1970 was legal and personal advo
cacy for the disabled. 55
The Senate report on the 1975 bill was clear and unequivocal on
the need for an independent protection and advocacy agency to pro
tect the human and legal rights of the developmentally disabled. 56
The final version of the bill thus included the requirement of a state
system of protection and advocacy.s7 The committee compromise
into account the size of the institutions and the service delivery arrange
ments of the facilities of the programs;
(B) in the case of other residential programs for persons with devel
opmental disabilities, which assure that care is appropriate to the needs of
the persons being served by such programs, assure that the persons admit
ted to facilities of such programs are persons whose needs can be met
through services provided by such facilities, and assure that the facilities
under such programs provide for the humane care of the residents of the
facilities, are sanitary, and protect their rights; and
(C) in the case of nonresidential programs, which assure the care
provided by such programs is appropriate to the persons served by the
programs.
The rights of persons with developmental disabilities described in findings
made in this section are in addition to any constitutional or other rights other
wise afforded to all persons.
fri.

53.
These rights are generally included in the conference substitute in rec
ognition by the conferees that the developmentally disabled, particularly those
who have the misfortune,to require institutionalization, have a right to receive
appropriate treatment for the conditions for which they are institutionalized,
and Ihallhis righl should beprolecledand assured by Ihe Congress and Ihe courts.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., lst Sess. 42, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG.&
AD. NEWS 961 (emphasis added).
54. H.R. REP. No. 58, supra note 46, at 7, reprinled in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 925.
55. fri., supra note 46, at 6, reprinled in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 924.
56. S. REp. No. 160, supra note 48, at 37.
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6012 (West 1977 & Supp. 1978-81).
§ 6012. Protection and advocacy of individual rights; reports; State allot
ments and reallotments; ratio; authorization of appropriations
(a) In order for a State to receive an allotment under subchapter III of
this chapter, (I) the State must have in effect a system to protect and advocate
the rights of persons with developmental disabilities, (2) such system must
(A) have the authority to pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate
remedies to insure the protection of the rights of such persons who are receiving
treatment, services, or habilitation within the State, (B) not be administered by
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stated clearly that "the Federal government and the States have an
obligation to assure that public funds are not provided in programs
which do not provide appropriate treatment, services and habilita
tion or do not meet minimum standards respecting . . . visiting
hours."58 The Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc., is
such a protection and advocacy agency, established by the State of
New Hampshire pursuant to section 6012.59
The question then becomes how the DD Act functions to pro
tect the rights of the developmentally disabled. It is on this question
t.hat much of the litigation on the DD Act focuses. The first case to
construe the Bill of Rights section of the D D Act was United States v.
the State Planning Council, and (C) be independent of any agency which pro
vides treatment. services, or habilitation to persons with developmental disabili
ties, and (3) the State must submit to the Secretary in a form prescribed by the
Secretary in regulations (A) a repon, not less often than once every three years,
describing the system, and (8) an annual repon describing the activities carried
out under the system and any changes made in the system during the previous
year.
(b)( I )(A) To assist States in meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of
this section, the Secretary shall allot to the States the sums appropriated under
paragraph (2). Allotments and reallotments of such sums shall be made on the
same basis as the allotments and reallotments are made under the first sentence
of subsections (a)(I) and (d) of section 6062 of this title, except that no State
(other than Guam, the Nortllem Mariana Islands, American Samoa, the Virgin
Islands. and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) in any fiscal year shall be
allotted an amount under this subparagraph which is less than the greater of
$50.000 or the amount of the allotment to the State under this paragraph for the
previous fiscal year.
(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), if the aggregate of the amounts
of the allotments for grants to be made in accordance with such subparagraph
for any fiscal year exceeds the total of the amounts appropriated for such allot
ments under paragraph (2), the amount of a State's allotment for such fiscal
year shall bear the same ratio to the amount otherwise determined under such
subparagraph as the total of the amounts appropriated for that year under para
graph (2) bears to the aggregate amount required to make an allotment to each
of the States in accordance with subparagraph (A).
(2) For allotments under paragraph (I), there are authorized to be appro
priated $3,000,000 for fiscal year 1976, $3,000,000 for fiscal year 1977,
$3.000,000 for fiscal year 1978, $9,000.000 for the fiscal year ending September
30, 1979, $12,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1980, $15,000,000
for the fiscal year ending September 30, 198 I. $8,000,000 for the fiscal year
ending September 30. 1982, $8.000.000 for the fiscal year ending September 30,
1983. and $8,000,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984. The provi
sions of section 1913 of Title 18 shall be applicable to all moneys authorized
under the provisions of this section.

Id
58.
AD.

H.R. REP. No. 58, supra note 46. at 42. reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo &
961.
521 F. Supp. at 366; 689 F.2d at 282 n.l, 287.
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Solomon,6o where the court denied standing to the United States to
bring a suit to enjoin state mental health policies. 61 The Solomon
court construed the statute to provide "a statement of minimum
objectives and standards for ... treatment, services and habilitation
which is made binding both on the federal government and the
states."62 The court further held that the DD Act provided a funding
mechanism to a state "if the state submits a plan complying with the
statutory and administrative requirements set forth in [sections16011
and 6012. "63 The court thus effectively held compliance with section
6012 to be a condition precedent for funding. 64
The first case to hold that the Bill of Rights sections ofthe DD
Act provides for a private cause of action was Naughton v. Bevilac
qua .65 Holding that the DD Act created a statutory right to appro
priate treatment,66 the court went on to state that "[t]he legislative
scheme and history indicate that Congress intended this statutory
right to be enforceable through individual private actions in the judi
cial [forum] . . . ."67 Although the court noted that the DD Act is a
funding statute, it scrutinized section 6012 and the requirement of an
independent protection and advocacy agency to protect the rights of
persons with developmental disabilities. The court reasoned that the
enforcement of individual rights cannot be achieved by the act of
simply withholding federal moneys, and that "the advocacy agency
and a private right of action are crucial to protect the rights secured
by the Act."68
A case that more directly focused on section 6012 was Goldstein
v. Coughlin .69 In that case, brought by the protection and advocacy
agency, the judge held that the agency need show no injury to itself
to have standing. 70 The reason was based upon the congressional
requirement as set forth in section 6012, to provide legal representa
tion to persons with developmental disabilities and to cast this re
sponsibility on the state protection and advocacy agency. 71
60. 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977).
61. ld at 1123. Bur see 42 U.S.C.A. 1997a (West 1981) which now permits the
United States to bring such an action.
62. 563 F.2d at 1124.
63. ld at 1125 (emphasis added). See 42 U.S.c. § 6063 (Supp. IV 1980).
64. 563 F.2d at 1125.
65. 458 F. Supp. 610 (D. R.I. 1978). offd. 605 F.2d 586 (1st Cir. 1979).
66. ld at 613.
67. ld at 616.
68. ld (footnote omitted).
69. 83 F.R.D. 613 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
70. ld at 614 (citing Naughton v. Bevilacqua. 458 F. Supp. at 616 n.3).
71. 83 F.R.D. at 614.
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The United States was again denied standing to bring an action
under the DD Act in United States v. Mallson. 72 The court held that
as the DD Act is a funding mechanism, with a built-in state protec
tion system in the protection and advocacy system under section
6012, the legislature did not contemplate federal enforcement of the
DD Act. 73 The court in Malison adopted the reasoning set forth two
years earlier in Solomon .74
.
The United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital,7S provides the
most comprehensive discussion of the DD Act to date. 76 The deci
sion, however, was eventually reversed by the Supreme Court. 77 The
Court held that section 6010 did not create the substantive rights
upon which the Third Circuit granted relief.78 The Third Circuit's
rationale, however, remains important. If future actions are brought
under the DD Act using the Garrity interpretation of rights79 the
thorough analysis of the court of appeals in Pennhurst, where, as
contrasted to the Supreme Court decision, the court actually reached
the merits,80 provides important guidance.
Finding that conditions at the Pennhurst State School violated
the DD Act, the court of appeals in Pennhurst affirmed the lower
court's finding of violations, but based its decision on statutory
grounds rather than on the constitutional grounds cited by the dis
trict court. 81
[The Act] established particular rights and benefits for the devel
opmentally disabled. . . . In addition. . . the Act expressly pro
vided that the developmentally disabled have a right to treatment
or habilitation. In the so-called Bill of Rights section . . . Con
gress made plain Its intention to establish a right to treatment
. . . . It is hard to see how Congress could have been any more
precise in revealing its intention to confer a right to treatment or
habilitation. 82
72. 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979).
73. Id. at 1299.
74. Id. at J:~97.
75. 612 F.2d 84, rev'd and remanded, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), on remand, 673 F.2d 645
(3d Cir.), em. gran/ed, 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982).
.
76. Id. at 95-97.
77. 451 U.S. at 5.
78. Id. at 18; see infra text accompanying note 91.
79. See infra notes \03-05 and accompanying text.
80. 612 F.2d at 92-116.
81. Id. at 89, 95.
82. 612 F.2d at 95-96; see infra text accompanying notes 96-97 for discussion as to
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The Third Circuit analyzed the funding mechanism of the stat
83
ute and reasoned that as a state must submit a plan for approval by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services before receiving any
federal funds, and that as the plan must meet certain requirements,
including assurances that the human rights of all persons with devel
opmental disabilities will be protected consistent with section 6010,
that this amounted to a statutory right to treatment for persons with
mental retardation that is enforceable by a private right of action. 84
One case following the court of appeals' decision in Pennhurst
held that the 00 Act granted substantive rights to individual plain
tiffs who were the beneficiaries of federal funds via participation in
state programs. 8S Medley v. Ginsb erg 86 rejected a requirement that
plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies. 87 The coUrt held that
there is no requirement in section 6012 of the 00 Act that plaintiffs
pursue any administrative remedies and that the section is a "condi
tion precedent to the receipt of Federal funds."88 Two subsequent
cases held that nothing in the language of the Act or in the case law
would prevent a plaintiff from seeking a private right. 89
The Supreme Court in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman ,90 however, dealt a severe blow to plaintiffs pursuing pri
vate causes of action under the DO Act. In an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court reversed the third circuit's decision and held
that the Bill of Rights section of the DO Act created no substantive
rights to be enforced by individual plaintiffs. 91
The Supreme Court construed the DO Act as a "federal-state
program whereby the Federal Government provides financial assist
ance to participating States to aid them in creating programs to care
for and treat the developmentally disabled."92 The Court held that
how the Supreme Coun differed with the Third Circuit's interpretation of the legislative
history of the Bill of Rights section.
83. 42 U.S.c. § 6063 (Supp. IV 1980).
84. 612 F.2d at 96-97. As the coun found the statute to include an implied right of
action, it thus found it necessary to apply the analysis outlined in Con v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66 (1975), to determine whether the right is enforceable by these plaintiffs. 612 F.2d at
97-98. The coun determined that the plaintiffs fulfilled the Cort criteria. Id
85. Medley v. Ginsberg, 492 F. Supp. 1294, 1304 (S.D.W. Va. 1980).
86. 492 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D. W. Va. 1980).
87. Id
88. Id (citing Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d at 97).
89. See, e.g., lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. 1268, 1278 (D. Conn. 1981); Henkin v.
South Dakota Dep't of Social Servs., 498 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D.S.D. 1980).
90. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
91. Id at 18; see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
92. 451 U.S. at II.
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states need comply with the conditions of the DD Act only if they
opt to participate in the program. 93 Construing the overall purpose
of the DO Act as financial assistance to participating state.s,94 the
Court determined that the issue to be resolved was whether compli
ance with the Bill of Rights section is a condition precedent to re
ceipt of this assistance, and thus whether substantive rights are
created which can be enforced by a private right of action. 95
The Court engaged in a comprehensive analysis of section 6010.
A plain reading of the statute, according to Justice Rehnquist,
showed that "[n]oticably absent from [section] 6010 is any language
suggesting that [section] 6010 is a 'condition' for the receipt of fed
eral funding. . . ."96 Justice Rehnquist then interpreted the legisla
tive history to show. that Congress had only modest and vague
intentions for this section. 97
Section 6012 clearly was distinguished 98 from the general, non
binding interpretation given section 6010. 99 While the Court found
that section 6010 merely suggests a preference for certain kinds of
treatment,100 section 6012 "conditions aid on a State's promise to
'have in effect a system to protect and advocate the rights of persons
with developmental disabilities.' "101 In DDAC then, the issue be
comes whether the regulations restricting visitation to residents ham
per DDAC's ability to fulfill its statutory mandate to provide
advocacy services. 102
Garrity was in accord with Pennhurst that section 6012 condi
93. Id. The Court also stated that although the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
elected to participate in the program, Pennhurst itself received no federal funds under the
DD Act. id. at 11, 28.
94. 451 U.S. at 11-12,22; see 42 U.s.C. § 6000(b)(I) (Supp. IV 1980).
9S. 4S1 U.S. at 10-11. The Court was also concerned with whether the DD Act
was enacted pursuant to Congress' authority under its spending power or section S of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at IS. The Court held, that as Congress did not explicitly
state that it was acting pursuant to section S o~ the fourteenth amendment, and that since
the DD Act functions in the nature of a contract, the states cannot be expected to accept
conditions not explicitly stated. Id. at 16-18.
96. Id. at 13.
97. The opinion is peppered with italicized words to prove his point. Id. at 21. But
see id. at 32 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). "It seems plain to me that Congress, in
enacting § 6010, intended to do more than merely set out politically self-serving but es
sentially meaningless language about what the developmentally disabled deserve at the
hands of state and federal authorities." Id.
98. Id. at 13.
99. Id. at 19;see Note, Pennhurst v. Halderman: A Bill 0/Rights in Name Only, 13
U. TOL L. REV. 214, 214 (1981).
100. 4S1 U.S. at 19.
101. Id. at 13.
102. See infra text accompanying notes IS8-67.
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tions aid on a state's guarantee that it have in effect a protection and
advocacy system. 103 Judge Devine, who was soon to hear DDAC,
distinguished Garrity from Pennhurst and found that the DD Act did
create a limited private right of action. 104 Even though the DD Act
primarily benefits the states by providing funds, it also benefits the
developmentally disabled. As the state cannot receive assistance un
less the Secretary of Health and Human Services approves the state's
plan, "it can be implied from the Act that a developmentally dis
abled person has a limited right to assure that the Secretary . . .
performs his statutory duty in enforcing the Act." lOS
It is clear then, that in DDA C plaintiffs can address their griev
ance through the DD Act if they amend their complaint to include
the Secretary of Health and Human Services. lU6 The Supreme Court
in Pennhurst clearly distinguished section 6012 from its holding,107
and the district court that will hear DDA C on remand expressly al
lows such actions. The analysis must then tum to a review of the
need for meaningful access to clients and the impact of the New
Hampshire regulations, to determine the success of such an action.

B. Need/or Access
Plaintiffs in Pennhurst and residents of LSS share one striking
similarity. The institutions in which they reside are old, in remote,
inaccessible locations, and are designed to separate persons with re
tardation from the mainstream population. lOS This isolation, and
103. 522 F. Supp.at 198.
104. Id at 199-202. One manner in which Garril)' may be distinguished from Pen·
nhurst is that the Supreme Coun suggested that the Pennhurst school was not a program
assisted under the DD Act. Id at 199; 451 U.S. at 28; see supra note 93. Judge Devine in
Garrity, analyzed a post-Pennhursl decision and concluded that he, as the Third Circuit
had inPennhursl,seesupra note 69, must also apply the Con v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
test that the Supreme Coun In Pennhursl declined to apply. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F.
Supp. at 200. By applying this test, the Garrity coun decided that a limited private right
of action did exist. Id at 20 I.
105. Id at 201; see supra note 63. In Garrity, the coun held that as New Hamp
shire was receiving funds under the Bill of Rights Act, the Secretary had thus implicitly
or explicitly approved of the state plan and thus the state was in compliance. The coun
suggested that the Secretary be made a pany to the action if the plaintiffs wished to allege
that he had failed to comply with the statute. 522 F. Supp. at 203.
106. FED. R. CIY. P. 15(a) allows for the amendment of a complaint at the discre
tion of the coun.
107. See supra notes 100-01; see also 451 U.S. at 50 (White, J.• dissenting). "[I]t
seems rather plain that [section 6012] contemplates not only ongoing oversight by the
Secretary but also enforcement of the rights of persons receiving treatment through judi
cial action or otherwise." Id
108. Brief of Amici Curiae at 7, Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman.
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the stigma associated with institutionalized persons with retardation,
results in a powerlessness and vulnerability,l°9 Given this situation,
it becomes clear that "[p]erhaps no identifiable group needs legal
services as desperately as retarded people." 110 Persons with retarda
tion, however, are an under-represented group of people. I I I
Many rights of this under-represented group are often effected
by their status. 112 Even though persons with retardation do have
rights,1I3 they are not "self-executory" and require dedicated advo
451 U.S. I (1981). on remand, 673 F.2d 645 (3d Cir.). cerl. granted. 102 S. Ct. 2956 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Brief of Amici Curiae). In DDA C the district court took judicial
notice of the fact that LSS is isolated from the community. Brief of Appellants at 76a.
supra note 18.
109. Herr, Civil Rights, Uncivil Asylums and the Retarded, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 679.
690-91 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Herr, CiVIl Rights).
110. Herr, The New Clients. supra note 10, at 583.
III. S. HERR, ADVOCATES FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES: REPORT TO
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MONITORS ON ADVOCACY NEEDS AND MODELS
FOR MASS...CHUSETTS CLASS CLIENTS 99 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HERR REPORT):
Schwanz, Fowlkes, Arons & Fleischner, Representing Mental(v Disabled Persons: Models
for Institutional Advocacy and Paralegal Training, in ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING
AN INSTITUTIONAL ADVOCACY PROGRAM: REPRESENTING PEOPLE WITH HANDICAPS
183. 219 (S. Schwanz, R. Fleischner & D. Ferleger eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as S.
Schwartz, R. Fleischner & D. Ferleger). Note, The New York Mental Health Informalion
Service: A New Approach to Hosplialization ofthe Mentall)' III, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 672.
672 (1967).
112. Brief of Amici Curiae at 13, supra note \08.
113. 451 U.S. at 27: Herr, The New Clients. supra note 10. at 586.
The issues of retarded persons' rights that deserve particularly close atten
tion are: (I) challenging involuntary commitment of any person on grounds of
mental retardation; (2) establishing II: system for automatic judicial or quasi
judicial review of institutional commitments; (3) creating a network of less
drastic alternatives to institutionalization. including home-based care with
horne assistance; (4) ensuring effective counsel at all stages of commitment.
including treatment or discharge; (5) providing friend-advocates, surrogate
parents in education hearings, and other types of lay advocates; (6) creating
and monitoring advocacy systems to ensure independent and vigorous legal ad
vocacy; (7) protecting rights to refuse habilitation without retaliatory discharge:
(8) securing damages and injunctive relief to halt abuse to brutality against resi
dents; and (9) obtaining free habilitative services.
Id See Dickey & Remington, Legal Assistance for Institutionalized Persons-An Over
looked Need, 1976S. ILL. U. L.J. 175, 176-77; Ferleger, Loosing the Chains: In-Hosplial
Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 444 (1973): Schoenfeld,
Human Rightsfor the Mentall)' Retarded' Their Recogmiion by the Providers 0/ Service. 4
HUM. RIGHTS 31 (1974); see also Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st CiT. 1980). vacated
and remanded sub nom .. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982) (case remanded to the
Supreme Judicial Coun of Massachusetts in light of their decision in In re Richard Roe.
421 N.E.2d 40 (1981». Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1966) (right to treat
ment): Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (right to due process in
civil commitment proceedings); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
orders entered, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.) (order for mental illness facilities). 344 F.
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cates to ensure that they are protected. I 14 A naked right, without the
mechanism for enforcement, is meaningless. I 15 The institutionalized
person must, therefore, have access to an advocate to see that rights
are enforced.
To operate effectively, the advocate must be independent of
outside restrictions. 116 The residents of institutions "need help in
overcoming the barriers of inertia and an isolated environment
• • • •"117 Without such independent advocacy services, these resi
dents will be unable to assert their rights, including the right to dein
stitutionalization. 118 The need for independent advocates is
. demonstrated most clearly when the wishes of the client and the cli
ent's guardian conflict. Although the courts have the power to ap
point a substitute guardian if the actions of the guardian are contrary
to the interests of the ward, the ward must have the support of a legal
advocate to articulate the need for such action. As the law of incom
petency does not assume an "identity of interest" between the guard
ian and the ward, the law must then provide the ward· with the
mechanism to assert his or her own interests. 1l9
Not only are rights meaningless without enforcement mecha
nisms, they are also meaningless if the institutionalized person must
rely on the institution's staff to provide physical access to an attor
ney. "Only a physically accessible advocacy office on the grounds of
an institution will ensure that clients and their friends can obtain the
assistance of qualified advocates." 120 The circumstances of instituSupp. 387 (M.D. Ala.) (order for mental retardation facilities), affd in part, rev'd and
remanded in part sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). BUI see
Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S: Ct. 2452 (1982) (limiting the right to treatment to minimally
adequate or reasonable treatment).
114. Brief of Appellants at 185a, supra note 18.
115. HERR REPORT, supra note I H, at 11,63. See Herr, The New Clienls, supra
note 10, at 571; Herr, Civil Righls, supra note 109, at 708. "Without adequate representa
tion, the question of rights for residents assumes a hypothetical cast. . . . If they are to
benefit fully from existing laws or proposed reforms, advocacy and representation for the
retarded resident will be decisive." Id
116.. HERR REPORT, supra note III. at 85. See supra notes 47-48 and accompany
ing text.
117. HERR REPORT, supra note III. at 81.
118. Herr, Civil Righls, supra note 109, at 724.
119. Id at 709 n.14O, 712-14; HERR REPORT, supra note III, at 89. See Mick
enberg, The St1enl Clienls: Legal and Elhical Consideralions in Representing Severely and
Profoundly Retarded Individuals. 31 STAN. L. REV. 625, 629 (1979).
120. HERR REPORT, supra note 111, at 72-73. See Herr. The New Clienls, supra
note 10, at 579-80.
Such problems of 'access to counsel' are greatly magnified when the potential
client is a retarded adult who resides in a mental institution. Lawyers rarely
venture into the back wards of institutions in which the severely and pro
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tionalized persons demand that legal advocacy services be available
at the institution. The isolation of the institution makes it difficult
for individuals to seek counsel on their own.121 Often individuals
are unable to leave the grounds of the institution, or are even una
ware that they have rights. 122 Thus, attorneys must go to the institu
tion and seek out their clients. 123 As a leading commentator in this
field states, "[a]dvocates must be able to visit wards and cottages at
reasonable times and in a reasonable manner in order to perform
such functions as visiting clients, giving information about client
rights, and investigating actual or possible instances of neglect,
abuse, or other rights violations."124
While the presence of an on-site advocacy project may be re
sisted by administrators and staff of an institution,125 often the end
result is that the project comes to be viewed as a positive force for
both the clients and the institution: 126 "As one Massachusetts insti
foundly retarded are housed and the equivalents of jailhouse lawyers are simi
larly rare. In some states, statutes and regulations oblige employees of the
institution to assist residents in communiCating their complaints to outsiders.
including lawyers. but institutional staff are clearly the wrong people on whom
to cast this responsibility. In some cases staff people have subverted the legal
process and prevented residents from securing counsel.

Id.
12 I. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. See also Herr. The New Clients,
supra note 70, at 577. "The present network of legal services for retarded people is fur
ther limited by the location of the legal advocacy programs and the geographic isolation
of prospective clients. The availability of legal assistance will often depend on where the
client happens to live." fd. Further, "mentally retarded and mentally ill persons in insti
tutions or in sheltered facilities are in no position to compete for scarce, publically
funded neighborhood legal services." HERR REPORT, supra note Ill, at 39.
122. Herr. The New Clients, supra note 10, at 596-97.
123. "With the fall of old barriers to advertising and solicitation. mental disability
lawyers providing free legal assistance through nonprofit agencies can advertise their
services. . . ." Id.
.
It was on this point that the First Circuit's decision in DDAC was based. "[I)t is now
clear that such legal advocacy organizations have first amendment rights which, in ap
propriate circumstances, may permit them to seek out clients and initiate litigation." 689
F.2d at 287 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963».
124. HERR REPORT, supra note III, at 77. "[A)dvocate must have unrestrained
access to clients and the capacity to pursue the full range of legal, administrative and
other remedies, including judicial recourse, on behalf of clients." Id. at 7.
125. Fowlkes, Arons & Fleischner, Representing Mentally Disabled Persons: Models
jor Institutional Advocacy and Paralegal Training, in S. Schwatz, R. Fleischner & D.
Ferleger.supra note III. at 221.
126. The Mental Patients Advocacy Project (MPAP) at Northampton State Hospi
tal represents their clients "aggressively. helping them to achieve their desired goals.
often in the face of strong staff opposition . . . . Yet we are accepted as a valuable. if
sometimes unpopular. component of the institution. We have even secured persuasive
letters of support from hospital and Department [of Mental Health) officials for the con
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tutional superintendent expressed it, 'I used to believe advocacy was
the panacea for mental retardation and psychotropic drugs for
mental illness. Now I'm not so sure about the drugs, but 1 do believe
in advocacy for both the mentally ill and the mentally retarded.' "127
The presence of the advocacy project increases the "ethical and pro
fessionally responsible behavior of mental health personnel . . . .
The concentration upon [clients'] rights is central to competent advo
cacy and to insuring public scrutiny of those institutions which wield
such enormous power over the lives of their clients."128
Although there is a fair amount of literature stating that advo
cacy services are essential to protect the rights of the institutional
ized, the case law in this area is, as yet, largely undeveloped.
Advocates for persons with developmental disabilities have had
to resort to other areas of law, and to analogize their clients' situa
tions to the available case law. Litigation concerning access to mi
grant farm worker camps provides a close analogy to institutional
law. 129 The camps, like the institutions, are frequently isolated from
the general population. 130 Courts have often granted legal services
attorneys access to these camps for the purpose of discussing condi
tions or offering assistance}31
The Supreme Court, in Procunier v. Martinez, 132 struck down,
as an arbitrary distinction, California prison regulations that denied
tinuation of our funding." Schwartz & Fleischner, Legal Advocacy for Persons Confined
in Menial Hospilals: A ViewJi'om Ihe Inside, in S. Schwartz, R. Fleischner & D. Ferleger,
supra note III, at 163, 175.
The hospital. may even view the advocacy program as having therapeutic value.
E.g., Lowry & Kennedy, Clinical Law in the Area of Mental Health, 1979 WIS. L. REV.
373, 387 n.62.
127. HERR REPORT, supra note lll, at 4.
128. Fowlkes, Arons & Fleischner, Representing Mentally Disabled Persons: Models
for InSlilutional Advocacy and Paralegal Training, in S. Schwartz, R. Fleischner & D.
Ferleger, supra note III, at 232.
129. Brief of Developmental Disabilities Advocacy Center, Inc. at 42, DDAC v.
Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief of DDAC).
130.· Id at 42-43; see supra notes \08-09 and accompanying text.
131. See Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973); Mid-Hud
son Legal Services, Inc. v. G.&U., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Folgueras v.
Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971). See also Brief of Amici Curiae at 25,
DDAC v. Melton, 689 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1982). Amici drew an analogy to Boddie v.
Connecticut, 40 I U.S. 371 (1971), where the Supreme Court held that, due to the funda
mental nature of marriage in this society, all individuals must have access to the judicial
system to dissolve that relationship regardless of ability to pay court costs. fd at 374. By
the same token, to deny institutionalized persons access to advocates, and thus to the
courts due to tileir inability to seek out services, would be a denial of due process when
important, and perhaps even fundamental rights are at stake.
132. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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law students employed by attorneys access to prisoners but allowed
students in law school programs free access.133 The Court noted the
isolation of the prisons, and the tremendous need for legal assist
ance,134 clearly a situation analogous to LSS and its residents.
The regulations at issue in DDA C create a similar arbitrary dis
tinction by restricting non-court appointed attorneys access to resi
dents while allowing court appointed attorneys free access. 135 This
indicates an intent on the part of the administrators to limit the abil
ity of residents to have access to counsel which violates section 6012
of the DD Act. As New Hampshire receives funds under the Act,136
the Secretary of Health and Human Services has violated his duty by
approving a state plan that contains this· arbitrary distinction,I37 and
thus is not in compliance with the law ..
The earliest discovered case dealing directly with the develop
mentally disabled was decided by one of the foremost champions of
the rights of persons with disabilities, Judge Bazelon of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. In Thornton v. Corcoran, 138
Judge Bazelon said that "[i]deally, there should be a specialized, ex
perienced bar skilled in legal problems revolving about mental ill
ness. There is not, however, and realistically there probably never
will be such a legal cOrpS."I39 While there is now such a legal corps
mandated by Congress,14O the issue is how to make it effective. 141
This specialized bar brought suit in Pennsylvania and succeeded
in winning a consent decree "to enjoin the defendant's allegedly un
lawful and arbitrary policies and practices relating to the patients'
rights to visit with, contact, get advice from and be provided services
by community organizers, citizens and attorneys."142 Although not
based on the DD Act,143 this case upholds a consent decree that pro
vides that patients have the right to meet with representatives of
133. Id. at 421.
134. Id. at 420: see supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
135. Draft Regulations, supra note 18, §§ He-M 802.03(b). 803.10.
136. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. at 203: see supra note 105.
137. 522 F. Supp. at 203; see supra note 87.
138. 407 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
139. Id. at 702.
140. 42 U.S.c. § 6012 (Supp. IV 1980).
141. HERR REPORT. supra note III, at 109. "The protection and advocacy pro
gram mandated by Public Law 94-103 is the prime conduit for advocacy funding for
developmentally disabled citizens." fd. at 108.
142. Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project v. Hospital Staff Civil Rights Comm..
444 F. Supp. 981. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
143. The cause of action was based on constitutional grounds. Id
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groups interested in protecting their civil rights. 144
The issue of the need for meaningful advocacy services for insti
tutionalized persons is not new to the First Circuit. 14s In 1978, in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, a con
sent decree was entered into in the case of Brewster v. Dukakis .146
Plaintiff class of persons with mental disabilities at Northampton
State Hospital brought suit against officials of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts claiming that their constitutional and statutory rights
to be treated in "appropriate, less restrictive alternatives suitable to
their needs" were being violated. 147 The decree entered by the court,
and agreed to by all parties, sought to establish a system to formulate
such alternatives, and jurisdiction was retained to enable any party
to seek further orders if necessary.I 48 There has been substantial
litigation regarding the decree, including a case brought to enforce a
clause relating to advocacy services. 149 "The [court appointed] Mon
itor will investigate and determine the necessity for trained, in
dependent advocates to assist clients in the protection of their rights
• . • •"150 The clause also set forth a requirement that the parties
cooperate in investigating funding sources for an advocacy
system.I SI
The Monitor's report was unequivocal on the need for trained,
paid, independent advocates lS2 and was based largely on the Herr
Report. IS3 The court found that an important aspect of meaningful
144. Id at 986.
145. In one case, the First Circuit expressly upheld visitation regulations that pro
vided for restricted access. In Cape Cod Nursing Home Council v. Rambling Rose Rest
Home, 667 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1981), the court held that the residents at the Rambling
Rose Rest Home had adequate access to their attorneys given the requirement of flexible
visiting hours and privacy during telephone conversations and visits as set forth in the
regulations. Id at 241. Cape Cod can be easily distinguished from DDAC, as the court
in Cape Cod based its decision on the fact that residents at the nursing home could have
mail and telephone contact with their cOunsel. In DDAC the residents were not able to
use the telephone or write letters, and were not aware of the need to do so to protect their
rights.
146. Brewster v. Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F, slip op. (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 1978) (consent
decree).
147. Id at 3.
148. Id. at 3, 4.
149. Brewster v. Dukakis, 520 F. Supp. 882 (D. Mass 1981), vacated and remanded.
687 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1982).
150. Brewster v. Dukakis, No. 76-4423-F, slip op. at 36 (D. Mass. Dec. 7. 1978)
(consent decree).
151. Id
152. Brewster v. Dukakis, 520 F. Supp. 882, 887, vacated and remanded. 687 F.2d
495 (1st Cir. 1982).
153. HERR REPORT, supra note Ill.
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access includes "access to clients themselves and, with appropriate
safeguards, client records." 154 The court found this need to be of
such significance, that in order to prevent the potential loss of a pri
vate advocacy project, the Commonwealth was ordered to fund the
advocacy services}55 Although the First Circuit eventually vacated
this aspect of the decision,156 the court was careful to limit its hold
ing to the funding issue so as not to "prejudice the determination of
the lawfulness of a more narrow order aimed at legal representation
in this case itself."157
C.

New Hampshire Regulations Deny Meaningful Access

In DDAC, plaintiffs contend that the regulations promulgated
by LSS regarding visitation and access to records limits their ability
to protect and advocate the rights of the residents}S8 According to
the regulations, visits are encouraged, but only as to certain classes
of people. Court appointed attorneys are included in this list, but
not attorneys from programs like DDAC}59 If the client is over
eighteen or does not have a guardian, or a guardianship petition
pending, the client may authorize any person to visit, unless the ad
ministrator "believes that the visit will adversely affect the client." 160
If the client is under eighteen or has a guardian, then the guardian or
parent may authorize visits, subject to the same limitations by the
administrator. 161 If the visit has not been authorized by either of the
above sections, or where a guardianship proceeding has been insti
tuted, the administrator shall investigate to determine whether the
visit would adversely affect the client. This decision must be made
within five working days of the request. 162 Nowhere in the regula
tions is the term "adversely affe.cted" defined, nor are any guidelines
drawn to determine how this standard is to be applied. Thus, a cli
ent's wish to see an attorney is within the discretion of the adminis
trator, while a court appointed attorney is allowed visitation
privileges.
Similarly, access to client records is limited to certain, arbitrary
154. Brewster v. Dukabs, 520 F. Supp. 882,890, vacated and remanded, 687 F.2d
495 (1st Cir. 1982).
155. Id at 891-92.
156. Brester v. Dukakis, 687 F.2d 495 (1st Cir. 1982).
157. Id at 500-0l.
158. Brief of Appellants at 185-86a, supra note 18.
159. Draft Regulations, supra note 18, § He-M 802.03(b).
160. Id, § He-M 802.05(d).
161. Id, § He-M 802.06.
162. Id, § He-M 802.07.
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classes of people. Clients over eighteen and without a guardian may
authorize others to have access to their records. 163 If a guardian has
been appointed, that person may also authorize such access}64 If a
guardianship proceeding has been instituted, the superintendent may
grant access, unless the release of information would have an ad
verse effect on the client. 165 Only a court appointed attorney shall
have limited access to a client's records. 166
The effect of these regulations is clear. If a client under the age
of eighteen, or with a guardian, wishes to challenge the actions of
that parent or guardian, the parent or guardian has, in effect, a veto
power on that individual's ability to seek legal help. Furthermore, if
any client wishes to seek advice on a matter requiring immediate
attention, the administrator has at least five days within which to
decide whether to allow the DDAC's advocate permission to visit.
By that time, irreparable harm may have .occurred. Even though an
appeal process is included in the regulations, the complaint is han
dled internally, by LSS officials}67 Even if the client is able to re
ceive the visitor when requested, if the advocate cannot have access
to the client's records, it would be very difficult for the advocate to
engage in meaningful intervention.
III.

CONCLUSION

By continuing to fund LSS, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services "has continued to place his imprimatur on the State of New
Hampshire's state plan requiTed by the [DD] Act, and has appar
ently determined that New Hampshire substantially complies with
the Act, for there is no indication that the Secretary has ever with
held~r threatened to withhold-funds from the State."168 DDAC
is New Hampshire's protection and advocacy system required by
section 6012 of the DD Act}69 The need for such an advocacy sys
tem clearly has been demonstrated,l1° yet the regulations promul
gated by the state make it difficult, if not impossible for it to provide
any meaningful protection or advocacy}71 New Hampshire, there
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
17 \.

fd. § He-M 803.07.
fd
fd. § He-M 803.07(c).
fd.§803.1O.
fd. § 802.10.
Garrity v. Gallen. 522 F. Supp. at 203.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108-28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158-67 and accompanying text.
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fore, is not in substantial compliance with the DD Act. If an amend
ment to the complaint is allowed, alleging that the Secretary has
breached his duty by approving New Hampshire's plan,172 and the
plaintiffs prevail, New Hampshire will be faced with the decision
either to comply with the conditions of the Act or face losing federal
financial support.
Nancy B. Alisberg

172. See supra note 105-06, 168 and accompanying text.

